I'd just like to jump in here and try to explain the Lakoff portion of these comments a little. First, let me say that Lakoff stresses the imaginative nature of human thought. Rather than being strictly logical and literal, concepts tend to be metaphorical. This is very important because it means that oftentimes meaning is determined not by a dictionary definition, but by how you frame a given situation and what metaphors you choose. With that in mind let's turn to morality.
Lakoff believes that there are basically two competing moral systems at work in society today (with many variations). "Strict Father" Morality and "Nurturant Parent" Morality. The significance of these systems is that they rank the various moral metaphors as being more or less important.
Strict Father Morality values very highly the metaphor of Moral Strength. The mapping is as follows:
Physical Strength -> Moral Stength
Physical Weakness -> Moral Weakness
There are also entailments of this metaphor. Note that physical strength must be built up. So, according to the metaphor, humans must "build up" moral strength lest they be morally weak. Because of this entailment, children (and adults) are viewed as inherently "weak" and must be strictly disciplined from an early age if they're ever to become "strong". There's a a folk version of Behaviorism that goes along with this that says that people are purely motivated my gain and deterred by loss. Combining these two concepts presents a view of humanitiy that is innately selfish. People seek to satisfy their desires and unless they have built up moral strength in the form of self-discipline, they will step on others to do so.
Nurturant Parent Morality values different metaphors, and presents an alternate view of humanity. The primary metaphor of Nurturant Parent Morality is Moral Nurturance:
Physical Nurturance -> Moral Nurturance
Physical Well-Being -> Moral Well-Being
In this metaphor, humans become moral beings by receiving love and nurturance and learning to love and nurture others (rather than by acquiring self-discipline). People are not seen as being inherently self-interested in this model but rather as beings that are capable of providing moral nurturance and receiving it. Indeed, following your own "self-interest" in this model would entail that you automatically seek to maximize the well-being of those around you -- for you cannot maximize your well-being unless those who nurture you have maximized theirs as well. As you can see, this conceptualization presents a radically different view of what it means to be selfish.
I'm not sure how much all this relates directly to what was being discussed above but I can say that any abstract concept (moral or otherwise) such as selfishness is not so cut and dry. The meanings of the words involved deeply depend on the underlying conceptual structure and framing methodology that you use.
As a side note, perhaps the most damning evidence against Behaviorism (and the notion that people are motivated primarily by reward and punishment) is the work of Kahneman and Tversky. The above study, as well as many others they've done, confirms that humans simply do not consider gains and losses logically. How can one act based on self-interest when one is often not aware what one's self-interest is?
Posted by dr_v at May 11, 2004 07:45 AMThanks for your explanation.
It is not clear to me whether you are saying that Lakoff has created these metaphors to conceptualize and classify the various moral codes in existence, or whether he is actually saying that the complex moral codes operate based on these metaphors. I find the latter unlikely.
"The above study, as well as many others they've done, confirms that humans simply do not consider gains and losses logically. How can one act based on self-interest when one is often not aware what one's self-interest is?"
That's true in some sense, but not in the sense that I mean. A self-interested person, as I use the term, is seeking to maximize his own pleasure and minimize pain. It does not necessarily mean that acts calculated to maximize pleasure and minimize pain actually do so. A self-interested act can have detrimental effects on the individual. I see no problem with that. For example, a person who eats a lot of fat and sugar is seeking pleasure in flavor. That doesn't mean that the total consequence of his eating habits won't bring more pain than pleasure down the road. The fact that more pain ultimately accrues doesn't take away from the fact that the act was one of self-gratification.
"People are not seen as being inherently self-interested in this model but rather as beings that are capable of providing moral nurturance and receiving it."
This capacity wouldn't make them any less selfish in the sense that I have used. Some people feel good when they nurture. The body pumps out chemicals that reward such behavior in some people more than in others. But there is a reward of pleasure somewhere in the mix.
I might also add that under the Richard Dawkins' Selfish Gene view, such nurturing acts have evolved for very selfish reasons--namely, colonies of genes build throw-away "survival machines" (i.e. bodies) endowed with an emotional structure that seeks to facilitate the survival of other survival machines in which copies of identical genes may sit. Helping people in the same group has survival value on a number of different levels (genetic affiliation and reciprocal aid and support down the road).
I’m not sure if you want to get into this more, but thanks again for the summary of his views.
"It is not clear to me whether you are saying that Lakoff has created these metaphors to conceptualize and classify the various moral codes in existence, or whether he is actually saying that the complex moral codes operate based on these metaphors. I find the latter unlikely."
Indeed, the latter is what I'm saying. It's been confirmed by an overwhelming amount of empirical evidence (that abstract thought is metaphorical in nature) but is still resisted greatly by the philisophical establishment. You'll just have to read some books about it if you want to learn more. Moral Politics is, of course, a good place to start.
"This capacity wouldn't make them any less selfish in the sense that I have used. Some people feel good when they nurture. The body pumps out chemicals that reward such behavior in some people more than in others. But there is a reward of pleasure somewhere in the mix."
Actually, there is a crucial difference here. You implied in one of your earlier posts that acting in one's self-interest entails a disregard for the interests of others:
"If you are living based solely on what YOU wish, you don't give a shit about whether other people dislike how your choices impact them."
This is not true under the Moral Nurturance metaphor where your well-being is dependent on the well-being of others. Acting in one's self-interest, under this view, implies the exact opposite of disregard for others. Herein lies the difference.
Posted by: dr v on May 11, 2004 11:01 AMYou are misinterpreting Dawkins in a way so predictable, he addresses it on page 3 of The Selfish Gene. He states :
"My own feeling is that a human society based simply on the gene's law of universal ruthless selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to live. But unfortunately, however much we may deplore something, it does not stop it being true. This book is mainly intended to be interesting, but if you would extract a moral from it, read it as a warning. Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish. Let us understand what our own selfish genes are up to, because we may then at least have the chance to upset their designs, something that no other species has ever aspired to."
Dawkins acknowledges that as humans, we have the ability to be truly altruistic, and that understanding the inherent genetic selfishness within ourselves can help in that process.
You state : "I might also add that under the Richard Dawkins' Selfish Gene view, such nurturing acts have evolved for very selfish reasons"
You are mistaken, Dawkins is not talking about the nurturing acts that Lakoff is referring to.
"Indeed, the latter is what I'm saying. It's been confirmed by an overwhelming amount of empirical evidence (that abstract thought is metaphorical in nature) but is still resisted greatly by the philisophical establishment."
What do you mean by "metaphorical"? When I say the "brain is like a machine," I am using a metaphor. In what sense is abstract thought based on metaphors?
By the way, no offense, but to say that anything has been "confirmed" in this domain is a bit of a stretch. There isn't any consensus even in such fields as neuroscience. But when you combine cognitive science, philosophy, psychology and other approaches, you get a chaotic mix of contradictions. I think you are jumping the gun just a little.
"If you are living based solely on what YOU wish, you don't give a shit about whether other people dislike how your choices impact them."
Allow me to clarify. If you are determined to live the live YOU wish regardless of what others think, I do think that implies that you don't really care about whether your choices impact them.
But selfish acts can also benefit others. The brain does provide a chemical payoff of pleasure for nurturing or helping other people. If the brain generated unpleasant emotions everytime you helped someone, you wouldn't be helping many people (I can assure of that).
"This is not true under the Moral Nurturance metaphor where your well-being is dependent on the well-being of others. Acting in one's self-interest, under this view, implies the exact opposite of disregard for others. Herein lies the difference."
Granted. But that doesn't mean that there is no chemical payment in exchange for the nurturing acts.
My claim is hardly controversial. Judging from your statements, Lakoff's theory does nothing to contradict what I am saying. People nurture because the body's internal reward system motivates them to do so.
"What do you mean by "metaphorical"? When I say the "brain is like a machine," I am using a metaphor. In what sense is abstract thought based on metaphors?"
Well, try to have some abstract thoughts without using metaphor. You'll quickly find that it's impossible. He has a warm personality. That concept went over my head. I don't grasp what you're saying. I see what you mean. All are instances of various metaphors.
"By the way, no offense, but to say that anything has been "confirmed" in this domain is a bit of a stretch. There isn't any consensus even in such fields as neuroscience. But when you combine cognitive science, philosophy, psychology and other approaches, you get a chaotic mix of contradictions. I think you are jumping the gun just a little."
That's just it, cognitive science *is* philosophy, psychology, linguistics and neuroscience (and computer science). There are results across these domains that confirm the notion of abstract thought being primarily imaginative and metaphorical. It is precisely because various research methodologies confirm the same result that the result itself is so stable and assured.
"Granted. But that doesn't mean that there is no chemical payment in exchange for the nurturing acts."
"My claim is hardly controversial. Judging from your statements, Lakoff's theory does nothing to contradict what I am saying. People nurture because the body's internal reward system motivates them to do so."
Let's remember how this thread started. It was by you claiming that Oscar Wilde's definition of selfishness was incorrect. It was my intent to address this claim only. I think I've done so by showing that there is no hard and fast definition of selfishness, but rather it can vary depending on the framing of the situation and the various metaphors at work.
Posted by: dr v on May 11, 2004 12:07 PM"Try to have some abstract thoughts without using metaphor. You'll quickly find that it's impossible."
Just because some thoughts are metaphorical doesn't mean that all of them are. I can think about the essence of numbers in pure abstract thought without any metaphors. For the most part, mathematics seems (to me) to be free of metaphors.
In any case, if I were a scientist, I would approach the study of morality in the following way. The basis of morality is the emotions. The capacity to feel guilt, shame, and remorse are key. There is also the capacity to feel sympathy and pity and a sense of duty and obligation. Fear is also important. These emotions are physical interactions of chemicals and electrical impulses in the brain and body. So, in theory, I'd expect an adequate description of morality to one day descend into chemistry, into how different chemicals configure into the patterns of emotions that make morality possible. Then I'd look at how cultural influences set parameters governing when the various emotions come into play. For example, the events that might trigger shame in Saudi Arabia might be very different from what would trigger shame in, say, China. The parameters would be different, but the basic underlying emotions would most likely be composed of similar chemicals. A full description of morality would have to account for the structure of the moral sensations (guilt, shame etc.) and provide a description of how perception of social norms triggers those emotions to keep the individual in line within society.
I imagine a parallel to Chomsky's description of language. He talks about the deep structure generating all the surface structures that manifest in different languages. It almost seems like the different moralities of the world are generated from a common emotional structure rooted in the human brain. The inquiry must ultimately descend into brain structure and chemistry. That's my view. Assuming metaphors are a part of this picture, where would they fit in? At the intersection of the chemistry of moral sensations and the perception of social norms that triggers the chemical reactions?
Posted by: Geoff on May 13, 2004 11:20 PM
Now, I know how much our guest doesn't like me... but below, I have highlighted all of the conceptual metpahors that I could find in his last comment. I counted 57. You should really read some of these books, Geoff, since I don't think you fully understand the nature of the metaphors and, thus, metaphorical thinking we're talking about, and also don't realize that you can't think about anything without using metaphors because it is the inate, natural way that humans, as embodied beings, conceptualize the world. In that way, it isn't something that you should necessarily be ashamed of or fight, but something that you should attempt to undersand and work into your theory about morality. How does phrasing both reflect and influence morality? Morality seems to stretch across cultures because we all share the basic human experiences of embodiment, health, sickness, hunger, pain, sadness, etc, etc. (There are at least 16 conceptual metaphors in this paragraph... 17 counting this sentence.)
"Just because some thoughts are metaphorical doesn't mean that all of them are. I can think about the essence of numbers in pure abstract thought without any metaphors. For the most part, mathematics seems (to me) to be free of metaphors."
"In any case, if I were a scientist, I would approach the study of morality in the following way [that's two separate metaphors]. The basis of morality is the emotions. The capacity to feel guilt, shame, and remorse are key. There is also the capacity to feel sympathy and pity and a sense of duty and obligation. Fear is also important. These emotions are physical interactions of chemicals and electrical impulses in the brain and body. So, in theory, I'd expect an adequate description of morality to one day descend into chemistry, into how different chemicals configure into the patterns of emotions that make morality possible. Then I'd look at how cultural influences set parameters governing [that's two separate metaphors] when the various emotions come into play. For example, the events that might trigger shame in Saudi Arabia might be very different from what would trigger shame in., say, China. The parameters would be different, but the basic underlyingemotions would most likely be composed of similar chemicals. A full description of morality would have to account for the structure of the moral sensations (guilt, shame etc.) and provide a description of how perception of social norms triggers those emotions to keep the individual in line within society."
"I imagine a parallel to Chomsky's description of language. He talks about the deep structure generating [that's three separate metaphors] all the surface structures [that's two separate metaphors]that manifest in different languages. It almost seems like the different moralities of the world are generated from a common emotional structure rooted in [that's two separate metaphors] the human brain. The inquiry must ultimately descend into brain structure and chemistry. That's my view. Assuming metaphors are a part of this picture, where would they fit in? At the intersection of the chemistry of moral sensations and the perception of social norms that triggers the chemical reactions?"
Posted by: Kristina on May 14, 2004 07:17 AMKristina,
First, it is clear that your use of the term "metaphor" is extremely broad. Please explain your reasoning for these terms:
Brain structure
Structure of sensations
Feel
I don't see how chemicals have a structure in a metaphorical sense. They are made of physical components held or combined in a particular way to form a larger whole. They are literally structures (as far as I can tell). Brains are structures, and so are the chemicals that comprise sensations.
Second, how does the presence of metaphors in my writing prove that it is impossible to think abstractly without metaphors?
Please explain to me how 2x + 5 = 67 is a metaphor.
I am not saying you are wrong, but I need a bit more before joining the all-abstract-thought-is-metaphorical club.
Allow me to answer for Kristina:
You have no idea what metaphorical thought is, how it works, its structures and its implications for human consciousness and reasoning. This is not to say you are stupid, but that you have not yet been enlightened. However, it is not her responsibility to explain these ideas to you, especially since you have not followed her advice to read books about these.
I suggest that you should answer your own questions by learning from scholars who know these subjects and have gone to the effort of writing books to educate people like us who are interested in learning about them.
Posted by: cody on May 14, 2004 05:58 PMCody,
The "appeal to authority" is one of the oldest and lamest modes of argumentation.
I understand the normal use of the term. Based on that definition, "structure", as used in "brain structure," is most certainly not a metaphor.
Ugh, is this guy still here? Has he still not read anything?! If he were in my class, I'd give him a big, fat "F" and send his ass to the Academic Dean.
Posted by: Kristina on May 14, 2004 10:41 PMP.S. I'd say the lamest mode of argumentation possible is not actually knowing (or even trying to learn) anything about what you're attempting to debate.
Posted by: Kristina on May 14, 2004 10:43 PMKristina,
You just can't do it, can you? When faced with a challenge to your viewpoint, you either appeal to authority (you must be right because Lakoff says so) or resort to insults.
I am sure Lakoff is interesting, but your grasp is apparently insufficient to answer my perfectly reasonable question. How is 3x + 2y = 67 metaphorical?
Posted by: Geoff on May 15, 2004 02:18 AMI don't know. I have a real academic life to attend to at the moment. Maybe you should find out for yourself... or you could wait until I finish school and actually have time for free reading again; I'd be more than happy to devote my summer to doing research just to answer a question you won't research yourself b/c you already know everything without having done any.
Posted by: Kristina on May 16, 2004 02:01 AM"brain structure" is not a metaphor but is literal...this was just a mistake it looks like
strictly speaking, to "feel sympathy" is metaphorical and not literal because sympathy is not something physical and, hence, you cannot literally feel it.
"structure of sensation/language, etc." - again, because sensation is not something physical it cannot have a physical, literal structure. You would have to evoke a metaphor such as Ideas are Objects:
An Object -> An Idea
Giving someone an object -> Giving someone an idea
Grasping an object -> Understanding an idea
Under this metaphor, thoughts are objects and have a metaphorical "structure".
Posted by: dr v on May 17, 2004 06:40 AMThanks for finding the one mistake I made, Geoff. That makes 56 conceptual metaphors in your comment, not 57. Also, I was thinking last night and thought of a total obvious metaphor about math. NUMBERS ARE OBJECTS; that is, we conceptualize numbers as physical ojbects that we can move around, handle, join them or separate them from other numbers. So, I would say "five eights make 35" the way one would say " two hydrogen and one oxygen make water". I know I was taught to do basic math using dots or sticks or beans or whatever that we could count and make little groups of so we could visualize the numbers, and translate that physical interaction into abstract mathematical thought. Other obvio math metaphors are "the numbers keep getting higher", "9 is a bigger number than 2". So, I thought of these on my own w/o having read the book... does that make you happy?
P.S. Like Gene's comment on Cody's blog, the men here and even my own man, seem to have such a greater capacity for being nice and fair to Geoff than me. I like that Dr. V's not afraid to tell me that I make mistakes (boy, do I), but at least he has my back the rest of the time and knows a lot about a lot of things. I really wish I could drop out of this convo b/c I'm obviously not capable of saying anything nice, but I just can't seem to for some reason...
Posted by: Kristina on May 17, 2004 07:42 AMGeoff,
I'm not familiar enough with Lakoff's work on mathematics to explain it to you. You're probably going to have to refer to his book if you want more information about this specific area of his research.
Posted by: dr v on May 17, 2004 12:16 PM